It is conceivable that such an operation could be sponsored by another country, in which case some of the motivation, technical experts, and muscle men might be brought in from outside. This difference would not change the problems that would have to be addressed or the operations required, but it could increase the assurance that important points are not overlooked. It might also provide the basis for considering a sophis ticated design rather than a crude type.

More Sophisticated Devices

Most of the schematic drawings that are available relate to the earliest, most straightforward designs and indicate in principle how to achieve a fission explosion, without, however, providing the details of construction. Since 1945, notable reductions in size and weight, as well as increases in yield, have been realized. Schematic drawings of an entirely qualitative sort are also available that indicate the nature of some of the principles involved in these improvements.

Merely on the basis of the fact that sophisticated devices are known to be feasible, it cannot be asserted that by stealing only a small amount of fissile material a terrorist would be able to produce a device with a reliable multikiloton yield in such a small size and weight as to be easy to transport and conceal. Such an assertion ignores at least a significant fraction of the problems that weapons laboratories have had to face and resolve over the past forty years. It is relevant to recall that today's impressively tidy weapons came about only at the end of a long series of tests that provided the basis for proceeding further. For some of these steps, full-scale nuclear tests were essential. In retrospect, not every incremental step taken would now seem necessary. Indeed, knowing only that much smaller and lighter weapons are feasible, it is possible at least to imagine going straight from the state of understanding in 1945 to a project to build a greatly improved device. The mere fact of knowing it is possible, even without knowing exactly how, would focus terrorists' attention and efforts.

The fundamental question, however, would still remain: that of whether the object designed and built would or would not actually behave as pre dicted. Even with their tremendous experience, the weapons laboratories find on occasion that their efforts are flawed. Admittedly, weapons designers are now striving to impose refinements on an already highly refined product, but they have had to digest surprises and disappointments at many points along the way.

For persons new to this business, as it may be supposed a terrorist group is, there is a great deal to learn before they could entertain any confidence that some small, sophisticated device they might build would perform as desired. To build the device would require a long course of study and a long course of hydrodynamic experimentation. To achieve the size and weight of a modern weapon while maintaining performance and confidence in perfor mance would require one or more full-scale nuclear tests, although consid erable progress in that direction could be made on the basis of nonnuclear experiments.

In connection with an effort to reduce overall size and weight as far as possible, it would be necessary to use fissile material in its most effectiveform, plutonium metal. Moreover, while reducing the weight of the assembly mechanism, which implies reducing the amount of energy available to bring the fissile material into a supercritical configuration, it would not be possible at the same time to reduce the amount of fissile material employed very much. In this case, the amount of fissile material required in the finished pieces would be significantly larger than the formula quantity. Alternatively, in an implosion device without a reduction in weight and size, it would be possible to reduce the amount of nuclear materials required by using more effective implosion designs than that associated with the crude design.

In either case---a small or a large sophisticated device---the design and building would require a base or installation at which experiments could be carried out over many months, results could be assessed, and, as necessary, the effects of corrections or improvements could be observed in follow-on experiments. Similar considerations would apply with respect to the che ical, fabrication, and other aspects of the program.

The production of sophisticated devices therefore should not be consid ered to be a possible activity for a fly-by-night terrorist group. It is, however, conceivable in the context of a nationally supported program able to provide the necessary resources and facilities and an established working place over the time required. It could be further imagined that under the sponsorship of some malevolent regime, a team schooled and prepared in such a setting could be dispatched anywhere to acquire material and produce a device. In such a case, although the needs of the preparation program might have been met, the terrorists would still have to obtain and set up the equipment needed for the reduction to metal and its subsequent handling and to spend the time necessary to go through those operations.

In summary, the main concern with respect to terrorists should be focused on those in a position to build, and bring with them, their own devices, as well as on those able to steal an operable weapon.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5738865&forum_id=2:#49022125)

Of course they're here, and as 9/11 will demonstrate, legal immigrants are perfectly capable of doing the shit

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5738865&forum_id=2:#49023087)

@grok

59m

@ExxAlerts @EmesVotes No evidence confirms a nuclear sniffer plane flying over multiple US states on June 16, 2025. A WC-135R took off from Omaha, Nebraska, and landed there after 4.5 hours, but flight data doesn't show multi-state activity. No news or X posts corroborate the claim. While military flights can be classified, public information suggests this is likely unsubstantiated.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5738865&forum_id=2:#49022097)