Association that section 45 defines fish as the term is used in sections 2062, 2067, and

2068 of the Act, by application of section 2. (California Forestry Assn. v. California

Fish & Game Commission (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1552 (California Forestry

Assn.).) That means the Commission has the authority to list an invertebrate as an

endangered or threatened species. We next consider whether the Commission’s authority

is limited to listing only aquatic invertebrates. We conclude the answer is, “no.”

Although the term fish is colloquially and commonly understood to refer to aquatic

species, the term of art employed by the Legislature in the definition of fish in section 45

is not so limited

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5120867&forum_id=2#44604470)

==

If there is no ambiguity, we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and we

apply the term or phrase in accordance with that meaning. “ ‘ “If, however, the statutory

terms are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible

objects to be achieved and the legislative history.” ’ [Citation.] While we exercise our

independent judgment in interpreting a statute, we give deference to an agency’s

interpretation if warranted by the circumstances.” (California Forestry Assn., supra, 156

Cal.App.4th at p. 1545.)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5120867&forum_id=2#44604489)

for the definition of fish to apply to purely aquatic species. A fish, as the term is commonly understood in everyday parlance, of course, lives in aquatic environments. As the Department and the Commission note, however, the technical definition in section 45 includes mollusks, invertebrates, amphibians, and crustaceans, all of which encompass

terrestrial and aquatic species.11 Moreover, by virtue of the express language in

section 2067, the Trinity bristle snail -- a terrestrial mollusk and invertebrate -- is a threatened species under the Act and could have qualified as such only within the definition of fish under section 45

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5120867&forum_id=2#44604492)

yikes!

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5120867&forum_id=2#44606096)

...the court did what it had to do in order to rule against the farmers.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5120867&forum_id=2#44604540)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C093542S.PDF

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5120867&forum_id=2#45209489)

pass up this opportunity to review the Court of Appeal’s

interpretation of the Fish and Game Code, which seems so

contrary to common knowledge that bumble bees are not a type

of fish? Doesn’t this clear disconnect necessarily amount to “an

important question of law” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(1))warranting this court’s intervention, because the Legislature

could not possibly have intended such a result?

Were things always that simple. Careful analysis of a

statute to divine legislative intent can sometimes yield results

that might seem surprising at first blush. Courts engaged in

this task have interpreted “less” as “more” (Amalgamated

Trans. Loc. 1309 v. Laidlaw Tran. Ser. (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d

1140, 1146) and “unlawful” as “lawful” (Scurto v. LeBlanc (La.

1938) 184 So. 567, 574). Long ago, the United States Supreme

Court concluded that the “seas” referenced in one statute

required no water at all (Murray’s Lessee v. Baker (1818) 16 U.S.

541, 545); quite recently, it determined that a fish is not a

“tangible object” (United States v. Yates (2015) 574 U.S. 528,

536).

These kinds of seemingly illogical outcomes can in fact

best capture the enacting legislature’s intent in a variety of

circumstances. A statute may be construed in a manner that

goes beyond the literal meaning of its text to avoid an absurd

result the legislature could not possibly have contemplated.

Sometimes courts perceive a scrivener’s error or typo that must

be corrected to vindicate the intent behind a measure. Or the

context surrounding the use of a word or phrase within a statute

can convey that it carries an unusual meaning, peculiar to that

law. The Court of Appeal below concluded that the interpretive

question before it fell into the last of these categories, with the

consequence that bumble bees should indeed be regarded as

“fish” under the CESA.

Even if the Court of Appeal arrived at what might

superficially seem like a counterintuitive result, that alone does

not establish that it erred.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5120867&forum_id=2#45209515)