It was actually way better for the plaintiffs than $100M would have been. $10M would have been the sweet spot.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5167151&forum_id=2#44964503)

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Moreover, under our common law the latitude necessarily accorded a jury in assessing non-economic damages does not insulate its verdict from appellate review for evidentiary support. Just as a jury's prerogative of assessing the credibility of evidence does not authorize it to find liability when there is no supporting evidence or no liability in the face of unimpeachable evidence, so a large amount of mental anguish damages cannot survive appellate review if there is no evidence to support it, or a small amount of damages when the evidence of larger damages is conclusive. The jury is bound by the evidence in awarding damages, just as it is bound by the law.

Our law distinguishes between appellate review for no evidence and insufficient evidence. The courts of appeals are authorized to determine whether damage awards are supported by insufficient evidence -- that is, whether they are excessive or unreasonable. We have rejected the view that that authority displaces their obligation, and ours, to determine whether there is any evidence at all of the amount of damages determined by the jury. In Saenz v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, we explained:

Not only must there be evidence of the existence of compensable mental anguish, there must also be some evidence to justify the amount awarded. We disagree with the court of appeals that "translating mental anguish into dollars is necessarily an arbitrary process for which the jury is given no guidelines." [Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters v. Saenz, 865 S.W.2d 103, 114 (Tex. App. --Corpus Christi 1993)]. While the impossibility of any exact evaluation of mental anguish requires that juries be given a measure of discretion in finding damages, that discretion is limited. Juries cannot simply pick a number and put it in the blank. They must find an amount that, in the standard language of the jury charge, "would fairly and reasonably compensate" for the loss. Compensation can only be for mental anguish that causes "substantial disruption in . . . daily routine" or "a high degree of mental pain and distress". Parkway [v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444, 38 Tex. Sup. J. 828 (Tex. 1995). There must be evidence that the amount found is fair and reasonable compensation, just as there must be evidence to support any other jury finding. Reasonable compensation is no easier to determine than reasonable behavior -- often it may be harder -- but the law requires factfinders to determine both. And the law requires appellate courts to conduct a meaningful evidentiary review of those determinations. One court of appeals has suggested the contrary. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 601 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1991, writ denied); Daylin, Inc. v. Juarez, 766 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Tex. App.----El Paso 1989, writ denied); Brown v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1988, no writ). We disapprove that language in those cases. 145

We concluded in Saenz that there was no evidence to support the $ 250,000 damages for mental anguish awarded by the jury.

This case is far clearer than Saenz. The record leaves no doubt that Bentley suffered mental anguish as a result of Bunton's and Gates's statements. Bentley testified that the ordeal had cost him time, deprived him of sleep, caused him embarrassment in the community in which he had spent almost all of his life, disrupted his family, and distressed his children at school. The experience, he said, was the worst of his life. Friends testified that he had been depressed, that his honor and integrity had been impugned, that his family had suffered, too, adding to his own distress, and that he would never be the same. Much of Bentley's anxiety was caused by Bunton's relentlessness in accusing him of corruption. But all of this is no evidence that Bentley suffered mental anguish damages in the amount of $ 7 million, more than forty times the amount awarded him for damage to his reputation. The amount is not merely excessive and unreasonable; it is far beyond any figure the evidence can support.

The other amounts of actual damages found by the jury are well within a range that the evidence supports. We do not consider whether the awards were unreasonable; that issue was for the lower courts. We conclude only that no evidence permitted the jury to make the findings it did.

Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 605-07 (Tex. 2002).

In the Jones case, of course, the _reputational harm_ is zero. The allowable amount of compensatory damage would thus be even lower than in Bentley._

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5167151&forum_id=2#44968082)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5167151&forum_id=2#44964523)