🚨 We’re going back to Afghanistan!!!
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Date: September 18th, 2025 3:11 PM
Author: .,.,.:,,.,:.,:,,:,.::,:.:.,.,:.,:,,.:.,.,:.::,
Cr bet Afgans lobbying hard for some of that that American $$ to come back
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777270&forum_id=2...id.#49281881) |
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Date: September 18th, 2025 3:16 PM
Author: .,.,...,..,.,.,:,,:,.,.,:::,...,:,...:..:.,:.::,.
We're FRIENDS with the Taliban and AQ now. Look at who our puppet is in Syria. Just shows how hollow the cries of "THEY'RE TERRORISTS!" and "WE SUPPORT DEMOCRACY" always are.
Also, I suspect the real game is going to be the US offers money, the Taliban goes to China and asks them to give them an offer, China does and then they reject the US offer and accept the Chinese offer.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777270&forum_id=2...id.#49281896) |
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Date: September 18th, 2025 3:22 PM Author: Paralegal Mohammad (Death, death to the IDF!)
Educate yourself, fool.
The Taliban are undertaking major infrastructure projects to project governance, attract foreign investment, and integrate Afghanistan into regional trade networks. Projects focus on energy, water management, roads, and railways, though challenges like funding and political instability persist.
Water management and energy
Qosh Tepa Canal: This significant project aims to divert water from the Amu Darya River to irrigate 550,000 hectares of farmland in northern Afghanistan.
Status: The first phase was completed in October 2023, and the second phase is underway.
Implications: The project has the potential to revitalize the agricultural sector but has raised concerns with neighboring countries about water usage and potential ecological damage.
Energy initiative with Azizi Energy: In August 2025, the Taliban signed a $10 billion memorandum of understanding with the private firm Azizi Energy to generate 10,000 megawatts of electricity over ten years.
Status: The phased construction began in August 2025 with a 200-megawatt solar plant in Kabul.
Kajaki Dam: The Taliban-led government continues work on the Kajaki hydroelectric dam in Helmand province.
Status: As of January 2025, the second phase of the project had increased power generation to 151 MW and was nearing completion.
Kamal Khan Dam: In February 2025, authorities inaugurated the third phase of the Kamal Khan Dam in Nimruz province, which will help manage flooding and irrigate farmland.
TAPI Pipeline: The revival of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline is a key energy project.
Status: As of September 2024, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan announced the official resumption of construction on the Afghan section.
CASA-1000 Project: This energy superhighway will transmit electricity from Central Asia to South Asia.
Status: As of early 2025, the project was still under construction, and it is expected to generate transit revenues for Afghanistan upon completion.
Transport infrastructure
Salang Highway and Tunnel: The crucial Salang highway and tunnel, which links northern and southern Afghanistan, is undergoing major repairs.
Status: The reconstruction involves domestic companies and has included periodic road closures throughout 2024 and 2025.
Afghan Ring Road: The Taliban are focused on completing the ring road, which they say will enhance trade by connecting Afghanistan to key regional economic hubs.
Road to Mes Aynak Copper Mine: In July 2024, the Taliban started building a road to the Mes Aynak copper mine to facilitate the long-delayed Chinese mining project.
Railway development
Trans-Afghan Railway: This proposed project aims to connect Uzbekistan and Pakistan through Afghanistan, creating a key regional trade corridor.
Status: In April 2025, Uzbekistan and Russia signed agreements for the project, and a feasibility study is set for 2025.
Kazakhstan-Afghanistan-Turkmenistan Rail: This project aims to create a route from the Turkmenistan border to the Pakistan border via Herat and Kandahar.
Status: In 2024, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan confirmed their interest and Kazakhstan pledged $500 million for the railway.
Khaf-Herat Railway: This rail network connects Afghanistan and Iran and is already partially operational.
Status: The final segment is scheduled for completion in March 2026.
Funding and challenges
Funding: Projects are financed through various methods, including regional partners like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, and China. Private sector investments are also occurring, such as the Azizi Energy project.
Challenges: The Taliban's infrastructure ambitions face significant hurdles, including diplomatic isolation, difficulty accessing the global banking system, security risks, and the overall weakness of Afghanistan's economy. While the Taliban promotes a secure environment for investment, concerns persist over security and regulatory oversight.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777270&forum_id=2...id.#49281921) |
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Date: September 19th, 2025 6:28 AM Author: Long TERF War for PeterBoi Poon ( )
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States%E2%80%93Taliban_deal
The United States–Taliban deal, officially known as the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the United States of America and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (commonly known as the Taliban and not recognized by the United States as a state) and commonly known as the Doha Accord,[1] was a peace agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban on 29 February 2020 in Doha, Qatar, with intent to bring an end to the 2001–2021 war in Afghanistan.[2][3] Negotiated for the U.S. by Zalmay Khalilzad for the first Trump administration,
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777270&forum_id=2...id.#49283390)
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Date: September 19th, 2025 6:39 AM Author: Long TERF War for PeterBoi Poon ( )
sorry about those tiny pink facts. Trump should be angry that Biden was 5 months late on the withdrawal date Trump had agreed with PapaRSF/Taliban
The U.S.–Taliban deal also dealt with the withdrawal from Afghanistan of "all military forces of the United States, its allies, and Coalition partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel". The Trump administration agreed to an initial reduction of U.S. troops in Afghanistan from 13,000 to 8,600 within 135 days (i.e., by July 2020), followed by a full withdrawal within 14 months (i.e., by 1 May 2021),
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777270&forum_id=2...id.#49283403) |
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Date: September 18th, 2025 4:47 PM
Author: .,.,...,..,.,.,:,,:,.,.,:::,...,:,...:..:.,:.::,.
We should never have stayed there to begin with.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777270&forum_id=2...id.#49282156) |
Date: September 19th, 2025 9:26 AM
Author: .,..,,.,.,.,.,.,..,.,.,..,..,
Forever wars are back on the menu!
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777270&forum_id=2...id.#49283592) |
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Date: September 19th, 2025 10:09 AM
Author: Brussels Sprout: Brussels,Helsinki,Stockholm,Kyiv
China’s present approach to Afghanistan reveals a meticulously crafted strategy that emerged following the U.S.-led withdrawal in 2021. With the exit of Western forces, Chinese policymakers identified a strategic window to establish direct engagement with the Taliban. This shift allowed China to reinvigorate major projects, including the Amu Darya oil fields, as well as gold mining operations in Takhar and Badakhshan, while reconsidering the long-stalled Mes Aynak copper mine project, originally awarded to China in 2010. However, China’s deepening involvement in the Wakhan Corridor signals a focus that extends beyond economic objectives, highlighting a pronounced interest in regional security and geopolitical stability. The Wakhan Corridor not only represents an opportunity to secure valuable resources but also functions as a strategic zone for monitoring and mitigating regional threats.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777270&forum_id=2...id.#49283672) |
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Date: September 19th, 2025 10:10 AM
Author: Brussels Sprout: Brussels,Helsinki,Stockholm,Kyiv
The Wakhan Corridor is emerging as a pivotal element in Afghanistan’s geopolitical landscape, with China and Pakistan actively involved in its development. Former Afghan Information Minister Mohammad Karim Khuram has highlighted that Pakistan had previously sought to utilize the corridor to establish strategic connections with Central Asia and China; however, these efforts were met with resistance under President Karzai’s administration. In early 2022, the situation evolved when the Pakistani military, in coordination with Chinese forces, crossed into the Afghan side of the corridor to adjust border demarcations originally established under the 1895 Russo-British agreements. This move provoked widespread backlash on Afghan social media, prompting the Taliban to deploy forces to reassert the historic boundary. Recently, the Taliban, with significant Chinese support, has committed to advancing the infrastructure within the Wakhan Corridor, underscoring China’s clear interest in integrating Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). High-level visits by Taliban officials and the Chinese ambassador to the corridor in August 2024 further emphasize the project’s strategic importance. Local communities believe that the corridor could play a crucial role in fostering economic stability, facilitating streamlined exports between Afghanistan and China, and promoting the development of surrounding areas. The Wakhan Corridor project illustrates China’s strategic intent to dominate Afghanistan’s economy, positioning itself as a key trade partner while outmaneuvering competitors such as Uzbekistan, Iran, the UAE, and India. By establishing a direct trade route, China seeks to circumvent more expensive, indirect pathways through Pakistan or Uzbekistan, thereby consolidating its economic influence in Afghanistan. Additionally, the project aligns with Pakistan’s broader goal of enhancing its trade connections with Central Asia, sidelining India’s influence in the region. From a security perspective, the Wakhan Corridor provides China with a buffer zone to secure its sensitive Xinjiang region. Concerns regarding groups like ETIM and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have driven China to create a “security belt” along the corridor, supported by two dedicated security units and coordinated patrols with the Taliban to reinforce local stability. China’s growing investment in Afghan infrastructure projects, including those in resource-rich areas such as the Amu Darya oil fields, further underscores its strategy of embedding economic initiatives that enhance regional security while serving its broader geopolitical interests.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5777270&forum_id=2...id.#49283676) |
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