agree that it costs $25 for a sandwich these days. which pisses me off. describe the AI miracle that would bring prices down

Date: May 12th, 2025 8:51 PM

Author: Jonald J. Trump

http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5724207&forum_id=2#48925458

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48925467)

http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=4677041&forum_id=2#41281557

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48925472)

its almost as if NYUUG is ALWAYS RIGHT.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48925656)

https://www.xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5724830&mc=29&forum_id=2

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48932101)

https://www.xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5724982&mc=38&forum_id=2

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48932129)

https://www.xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5725119&mc=82&forum_id=2

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48934944)

http://xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5725639&mc=1&forum_id=2

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48935166)

http://xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5726610&mc=26&forum_id=2

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48942294)

http://xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5726373&mc=45&forum_id=2

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48946351)

http://xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5727634&mc=7&forum_id=2

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48946406)

NYUUG SO POOR ABSOLUTE INCOMES DURR DURR

BUT BUT...MUH SAMMIE!

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48946439)

https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2025/02/03/south-korea-has-a-big-household-debt-problem-the-countrys-unique-rental-system-may-be-to-blame.html

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48946469)

The distinction now applies to individuals living in Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, San Mateo, San Francisco, and Marin counties. In 37% of counties, a family of four living on a six-figure income is now considered low-income.

The report by the California Department of Housing and Community Development came amid the state’s struggle with a shortage of affordable housing and rising inflation costs.

In 2020, not a single county considered a person making six figures to be low-income, according to SFGATE. Over the past five years, Santa Clara County saw its low-income figure jump to $33,150. The county has the highest low-income salary in California at $111,700.

California is the third most expensive state to live in, with the average resident spending 38.5% more on their cost of living than the national average.

People making over $100,000 now considered low-income in several California counties

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48952677)

Aurora Di Nuoscio

May 4, 2025

In recent decades, South Korea has endured a severe demographic crisis due to the continuous decline in the birth rate. In a highly competitive society marked by strong economic pressures, gender inequalities, and traditional cultural expectations, an increasing number of young Koreans are struggling to create a stable future and start families. The decision to postpone or even give up parenthood altogether is often experienced not as an independent choice, but as a forced consequence of the prevailing living conditions. In this context, the ongoing birth crisis becomes the symbol of deep-rooted generational discontent.

“Hell Joseon” (헬조선 in Korean) is a popular term among South Koreans used to express a deep sense of disillusionment and frustration, particularly felt by younger generations in response to ongoing economic and social challenges. The term refers back to the Joseon Dynasty, a historical period of great suffering, social rigidity, and lack of mobility, struggles to which contemporary South Koreans feel related to now more than ever. The development of South Korea into a late-stage capitalist society has produced a competitive job market, along with a high cost of living, significantly impacting the livelihoods and decision-making of South Koreans concerning childbirth. This feeling of uncertainty and instability is reflected in the country’s low birth rate: the new generation has increasingly lost hope for its future in such a difficult social environment, and the idea of starting a family is essentially inconceivable. In this context, the decision to postpone having children is generally seen as a response to such economic constraints rather than a personal choice.

South Korea’s economic model is built on the advancement of industrial and technological sectors. However, prioritizing these sectors results in the marginalization of social welfare programs that can mitigate economic pressures. In fact, the high cost of education and housing contributes directly to the decision to delay or even reject parenthood, as the financial burden associated with raising children in an ultra-competitive society is often too great to bear. Without substantial support, the economic cost of child-rearing becomes daunting to many and is therefore preferred to be avoided entirely. This reality, experienced by many young Korean couples, has been popularized through the expression “Double Income and No Kids,” which refers to those couples who decide not to have children right away — or ever, for that matter — because of financial or professional constraints.

However, even amid hard economic conditions, gender inequalities and misogyny still play an important role in the decision to delay or avoid parenthood. Traditional gender roles instill the expectation that women should bear the burden of child-rearing together with domestic responsibilities, simultaneously contributing financially to the household income, while husbands are the main providers of the family. This dual burden leads to what is often referred to as the motherhood penalty, where women face significant setbacks in their careers if they do choose to start a family. At the same time, women’s desire to become mothers has declined as their level of education and labor force involvement has increased. As a result, having children has become an increasingly expensive luxury, leading some women to decide not to procreate because of the financial strain that comes with raising a family, as well as the societal expectation to become the main caregiver in the family.

Due to these structural and social inequalities, a new culture of individualism is reshaping conventional family values and creating new cultural standards in South Korean society. There is an emerging pattern among the “Nipo generation” to reject conventional cultural expectations regarding marriage and parenting. The popularity of activities like “Hon-bap” (eating alone), “Hon-sul” (drinking alone), and “Hon-nol” (playing alone) has increased, indicating not only a shift toward child-free households but also the underlying conditions that affect such reproductive choices.

In South Korea, several women, driven by gender inequality and discrimination, have begun to advocate for personal fulfillment and professional development. More and more women who refuse to adhere to traditional gender norms are joining the so-called “4B Movement.” The B (bi 비/非 in Korean) means “no,” and the name of the movement reflects the four principles of bihon (no marriage), bichulsan (no childbirth), biyeonae (no dating) and bisekseu (no sex). By refusing to have children, marry, or engage with men altogether, women in this movement seek to redefine the female role in South Korean society. The movement reflects dissent from stereotypically patriarchal roles in which the woman is relegated to the role of housewife or caretaker, and the man is forced to be the breadwinner of the family.

What began as a gradual decline in fertility has, over time, evolved into a full-blown demographic crisis. In fact, since the 1970s, South Korea’s birth rate has steadily declined, reaching historic lows in recent years. According to the Korean National Statistics Institute, the Crude Birth Rate — the annual number of live births per 1,000 people — was 5.9 in 2019, dropping by 0.6 individuals in just one year to 5.3 in 2020, and steadily declining until reaching 4.9 in 2024. Furthermore, the nation’s fertility rate attained a new record low in 2018, when it reached 0.98, declining below 1 for the first time. By 2024, the Total Fertility Rate had reached 0.75, far below the 2.1 replacement level required to maintain the population replacement.

An additional demographic factor that is frequently overlooked in analyses of South Korea’s declining birth rate is the age structure of the female population and the proportion of women of reproductive age. A decline in fertility results in a decrease in the number of births, which, in turn, leads to a subsequent decline in the number of women who are able to have children. This phenomenon is indicative of a self-reinforcing cycle of population decline. Since the 2000s, South Korea has entered a new phase where not only has fertility remained low, but the number of women of childbearing age has also significantly diminished and, therefore, accelerated demographic decline. To further worsen the situation, South Korea is currently suffering from the severe sex ratio imbalance of the 1980s and 1990s, when sex-selective abortions were performed due to a preference for male sex births. Although the sex ratio at birth has since normalized, the effects of that imbalance are now evident in the current reproductive-age population. Thus, South Korea’s birth rate challenges, other than being influenced by the above-mentioned socioeconomic pressures, are also deeply rooted in demographic structures shaped by past societal preferences.

In response to the country’s demographic stagnation, the South Korean government has attempted to reverse these trends through various financial incentives. The goal of these initiatives has been to increase the birth rate by encouraging young couples to build families and raise children. More than 360 trillion won ($270 billion) have been set aside since 2006 for programs, including childcare subsidies, where parents get two million won ($1,510) in cash upon their child’s birth. In an effort to slow down the aging of the population and boost reproduction rates, a basic five-year plan covering the years 2006 to 2020 was developed, and only in 2024 the government allocated 39.8 trillion won ($30 billion) to incentivize higher birth rates.

Despite government initiatives, official data shows that the birth rate is still dropping, diminishing the population as a whole. This is because government policies, throughout the years, have been based on the “select and concentrate” approach. The tactic is used to prioritize measures that are thought to have the most immediate impact while ignoring others. For these measures to be effective, they must be part of a larger strategy that includes comprehensive reforms in workplace culture, gender equality, and social security systems that incentivize a gradual but permanent change in a very advanced but still rigidly patriarchal Korean society.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48952694)

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/economy/20241118/half-of-one-person-households-moonlight-to-cope-with-rising-cost-of-living

Half of one-person households moonlight to cope with rising cost of living

Half of one-person households moonlight to cope with rising cost of living

By Yi Whan-woo

Published Nov 18, 2024 7:37 am KST

Updated Nov 18, 2024 7:37 am KST

More than half of all single-person households in Korea hold an additional job to cope with the rising cost of living, according to a report, Sunday.

The report released by KB Financial Group’s think tank showed that 54.8 percent of 2,000 single-person households surveyed said they took on an extra job, citing reasons such as insufficient income for daily expenses and the need to save for emergencies.

The findings were based on an online survey of 2,000 single-person households aged 25 to 59, residing in the capital, the greater Seoul area, or other metropolitan cities across the country.

In contrast, a 2022 survey revealed that 42 percent of all single-person households in Korea held an additional job to deal with the increasing cost of living.

“The outcome shows an increasing number of Koreans living by themselves are burdened by high prices and high interest rates,” the think tank analyzed.

Among the 2,000 survey respondents this year, 38.8 percent said they took on an additional job to save money for emergencies.

Another 18.7 percent said they took on an additional job because they have time to spare, while 13.2 percent said it was due to insufficient income to cover living expenses.

The survey also revealed that single-person households have an average of 12.9 meals per week, or 1.8 meals per day, a decrease from 2020 when the average was 15.5 meals per week, or 2.2 meals per day.

Meanwhile, 71.2 percent of this year’s survey respondents expressed satisfaction with being part of a single-person household, an increase from 68.2 percent in 2022.

By age and gender, women in their 20s and 30s reported the highest satisfaction with living alone, with 83.5 percent expressing contentment. This was higher than the 72.6 percent satisfaction rate among women in their 40s and 50s and the 70.2 percent among men in their 20s and 30s.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48952721)

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/amp/economy/20241118/half-of-one-person-households-moonlight-to-cope-with-rising-cost-of-living

“Half of one-person households moonlight to cope with rising cost of living”

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48946676)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48931627)

that's what I thought

bang it rang!

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3543550&forum_id=2...id.#48931565)