Date: June 4th, 2025 4:26 PM
Author: green dashing casino selfie
Actually the reason you guys are using old obsolete bombers is because you no longer have the Soviet supply chains and slave labor to produce new ones
Grok, why was Russia better able to mass produce military equipment in the 1960s-1980s than it can today?
Russia was better able to mass produce military equipment in the 1960s–1980s than it can today for several interconnected economic, political, and structural reasons:
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1. Centrally Planned Command Economy
• Soviet model: The USSR had a centrally planned economy, meaning the state directly allocated resources and production targets. Military production was prioritized regardless of consumer needs or market efficiency.
• Civilian sacrifice: The state could funnel disproportionate amounts of GDP into military-industrial output by suppressing civilian consumption and investment in other sectors.
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2. Size and Integration of the Soviet Bloc
• The USSR not only had control over the economies of its republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc.) but also heavily influenced the Warsaw Pact countries (e.g., East Germany, Poland).
• This gave it access to a broader industrial base, skilled labor, and resource networks that no longer exist in the same integrated form today.
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3. Mass Mobilization Model
• The Soviet Union emphasized quantity over quality in weapons systems, enabling easier and faster mass production.
• Designs were often simpler, rugged, and meant for mass mobilization, like the AK-47, T-55, and MiG-21—products optimized for industrial output and wartime scale-up.
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4. State-Owned Military Industrial Complex
• Virtually all arms factories and design bureaus were state-owned and subordinated to the Ministry of Defense.
• This allowed the regime to rapidly ramp up or repurpose production without worrying about profits, competition, or intellectual property concerns.
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5. Post-Soviet Collapse
After 1991, Russia:
• Lost access to factories in former Soviet republics (e.g., tank parts from Ukraine, electronics from Latvia, etc.).
• Transitioned partially to a market economy, weakening centralized control over defense production.
• Suffered from brain drain, underinvestment, and corruption, all of which hollowed out the defense sector over time.
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6. Modern Complexity
• Today’s military systems (drones, advanced missiles, radar, etc.) are more technologically complex and require specialized electronics and precision manufacturing.
• Russia is now heavily constrained by Western sanctions, especially in acquiring microchips and high-end machine tools.
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7. Corruption and Mismanagement
• The post-Soviet Russian military-industrial complex has faced systemic corruption.
• Projects are often delayed or underdelivered, and many defense factories operate below capacity due to theft, inefficiencies, or lack of skilled labor.
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Summary
The USSR’s ability to mass-produce arms was built on a wartime-style economy with rigid top-down control, simpler technology, and vast integrated resources. Today’s Russia lacks that scale, integration, or ideological focus—and faces modern supply chain, sanctions, and complexity challenges that its Soviet predecessor did not.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5732356&forum_id=2#48986991)