no purpose other than to delay (without legal support). sanctionable?

i think that even Justice Jackson will ignore it.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5865227&forum_id=2#49876125)

https://apnews.com/article/virginia-democrats-redistricting-congress-supreme-court-ceb7d76e5a39ac87e67cb165f5447835

the filing:

https://www.virginiascope.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SCOTUS-appeal.pdf

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5865227&forum_id=2#49880694)

======

A. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s Decision Was Predicated on a

Grave Misunderstanding of Federal Law.

The decision below relied on its mistaken understanding of the meaning of the

term “election” in federal law as a basis for its interpretation of that same term in the

Virginia Constitution. Where “a state court decision fairly appears . . . to be

interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any

possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion,” this Court may

review the interwoven federal law issue. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41. This Court’s

“role when a state court’s interpretation of state law has been influenced by an

accompanying interpretation of federal law” is to correct the lower court’s

“misapprehensions” about the scope of federal law. Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S.

at 152.

1. The Virginia Supreme Court’s decision was interwoven with a grave

misinterpretation of federal election law in two ways. First, the Court based its

“definition” of “election” on federal law. The Court relied on this Court’s decision in

Foster v. Love to reason that “[w]hen the law speaks of an ‘election,’ it ‘plainly refer[s]

to the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an

officeholder.’” App. 19a (quoting Foster, 522 U.S. at 71 and citing Millsaps v.

Thompson, 259 F.3d 535, 547 (6th Cir. 2001); Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001); Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer,

199 F.3d 773, 775-76 (5th Cir. 2000)). To reach its critical conclusion, it inferred,

again based on Foster, that “[t]he ‘combined actions’ that define the term ‘election’ . . .

include citizens casting votes, from the beginning of the early-voting period until

Election Day, and the officers of election receiving these votes and closing the polls

on ‘Election Day.’” App. 19a (quoting Foster, 522 U.S. at 71). The Court then adopted

what it saw as the “short and clear” “definition” from federal law: “‘History confirms

that ‘election’ includes both ballot casting and ballot receipt.’” App. 19a-20a (quoting

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Wetzel, 120 F.4th 200, 209 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. granted

sub nom., Watson v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 146 S. Ct. 355 (2025)).

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s interpretation of Article XII of the Virginia

Constitution thus rested materially on its understanding of federal election law in

Foster and the federal circuit court cases upholding early voting under the federal

election day statutes. The “most reasonable explanation [is] that the state court

decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do

so.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1041. Where, as here, a state court indicates that state and

federal law are “identical,” its decision “does not rest on an independent and adequate

state ground.” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588 n.4 (1990). See also Florida

v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 57-58 (2010) (finding no independent and adequate state

ground where state supreme court “trained on what [federal law] demands, rather

than on what [state] law independently requires”); Fitzgerald v. Racing Assn. of

Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 106 (2003) (holding state court decision relied on federal

law where “same analysis” applied).

Second, the Court unavoidably relied on its conception of federal election law

to reject the dissent’s argument that “[b]y extending elections in the Commonwealth

of Virginia beyond a single day, the majority’s formulation would directly conflict with

the federal mandate that elections for federal offices be held on a single day.” App.

27a. The Court again invoked Foster and the federal circuit court cases upholding

early voting that characterize the “election” as “consummated” on the date of the

“election” established by federal statute. App. 27a-28a. Based on its reading of those

federal cases, it concluded that “[n]o persuasive, much less binding, federal law

supports the dissent’s implied claim that our interpretation of Article XII, Section 1

violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.” App. 28a.

2. The understanding of federal law on which the Virginia Supreme Court

based its ruling was gravely mistaken. It simply ignored the federal statutes that

settle the question: “The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every

even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States

and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress

commencing on the 3d day of January next thereafter.” 2 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added);

see also 2 U.S.C. § 1; 3 U.S.C. § 1. As Applicants explained in their briefs to the

Virginia Supreme Court, the interpretation that “an ‘election’ included any time at

which a ballot may be cast” entails that “every state—including Virginia—that

permits early absentee voting would violate the federal ‘mandate to hold all elections

15

for Congress and the Presidency on a single day throughout the Union’” that this

Court recognized in Foster. App. 154a (quoting Foster, 522 U.S. at 70) (cleaned up).

See also App. 197a-198a.

The Virginia Supreme Court blatantly misreads the federal circuit cases

upholding early voting in a way that, as the dissent explained, would render early

voting unlawful. According to the decision below, the circuit court decisions upheld

early voting because early voting was part of the “election” that includes the

“‘combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an

officeholder.’” App. 19a (quoting Foster, 522 U.S. at 71). That is the opposite of their

true holding. The circuit cases held, as they must considering the clear text of the

federal Election Day statutes, that early voting is lawful because it does not expand

the duration of the “election” itself. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[t]he Foster

definition of ‘election’ implies that there is only a single election day . . . when the

election is ‘consummated,’ even though there are prior voting days.” Keisling, 259

F.3d at 1175. It is precisely because early voting precedes the general election, and

does not expand it, that early voting is consistent with the federal definition of a

single “day for the election.”

This settled understanding of federal election law is common ground in Watson

v. Republican National Committee, which is currently pending before this Court. The

issue in that case is whether the federal Election Day statutes require that all mailin ballots be received by the end of Election Day. As the respondent in Watson put it,

“Congress has established the Tuesday following the first Monday in November as

16

the uniform day for federal elections.” Brief of Respondent in Opposition, at 1 (U.S.,

No. 24-1260) (Aug. 11, 2025) (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; 3 U.S.C. § 1). In contrast to the

decision below, respondent there further recognized the unquestioned lawfulness of

early voting under those statutes, acknowledging that “the circuits unanimously

agree that early voting doesn’t violate the election-day statutes.” Id. at 13 (citing

Keisling, 259 F.3d at 1176; Millsaps, 259 F.3d at 544-46; Bomer, 199 F.3d at 776).

See also Brief of Respondent, at 16 (U.S., No. 24-1260) (Feb. 9, 2026); Oral Argument

Transcript at 73 (“[U]nder our theory, early voting is permissible . . . because of this

idea that the Election Day is the date where the election is consummated.”).

As the United States explained as amicus curiae, “[i]f the ‘election’ occurs

whenever voters make their final choice, early voting would stretch the contest

beyond ‘the day’ set by law; but early voting does not present that problem if ‘the

election’ is the day when the ballot box closes and officials must be in receipt of all

timely votes.” Brief of United States, at 3 (U.S., No. 24-1260) (Feb. 17, 2026). See also

id. at 7 (rejecting “reading [that] would invalidate early voting, because it would

stretch ‘the election’ for days beyond ‘the day’ on which it must occur.”); id. at 15

(rejecting reading that “an ‘election’ is the conclusive choice made by voters when

they mark and submit their ballots” because under that reading “early voting would

plainly be barred by the federal election-day statutes”) (cleaned up); Oral Argument

Transcript at 131 (“We agree with both sides that early voting is still acceptable”

under federal Election Day statutes).

17

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision thus depended on a grave misreading

of federal law that no other court, state or federal, has ever accepted and which

numerous federal courts have expressly rejected. This Court is therefore reasonably

likely to grant certiorari and reverse the decision below on that basis.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5865227&forum_id=2#49880707)

====

B. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s Decision Transgressed the

Ordinary Bounds of Judicial Review.

This Court recently reaffirmed its “obligation to ensure that state court

interpretations of that law do not evade federal law” in the context of federal

elections. Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 34 (2023). Although “the Elections Clause does

not exempt state legislatures from the ordinary constraints imposed by state law,” it

also does not give “state courts . . . free rein” in rendering decisions invalidating a

congressional map under state law. Id. at 34. The Court declined to articulate a

specific standard beyond the command that state courts must “not transgress the

ordinary bounds of judicial review” to “arrogate to themselves the power vested in

state legislatures to regulate federal elections.” Id. at 36. See also id. at 38-39

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (endorsing standard barring state courts from

“impermissibly distort[ing]” state law as “deference . . . not abdication”).

This is the rare case in which a state court’s decision so dramatically departed

from the text of the state constitution that it satisfied this exacting standard. Even

with “the usual deference [this Court] afford[s] state court interpretations of state

law,” the decision below “impermissibly distorted” the Virginia Constitution “beyond

what a fair reading required.” Moore, 600 U.S. at 36 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.

98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)). See also Bush, 531 U.S. at 133 (Souter,

18

J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (considering whether

state court interpretation “transcends the limits of reasonable statutory

interpretation to the point of supplanting the statute enacted by the ‘legislature’

within the meaning of Article II”). The Virginia Supreme Court’s decision ignores the

text of the Virginia Constitution, and its resulting interpretation of “general election”

is at war with the Constitution that the people of the Commonwealth adopted.

The text of the Virginia Constitution establishes that a “general election” is the

legally operative event on a particular day on which a result is determined—not the

entire period during which ballots may be cast during early voting. The Constitution

uses the phrase “election” across multiple provisions. Article II, Section 6—the

provision that governs apportionment of congressional districts and which the

redistricting amendment amended—provides that “[t]he districts delineated in the

decennial reapportionment law shall be implemented for the November general

election.” Va. Const. art. II, § 6. This provision unmistakably indicates that, as a

matter of ordinary English usage, the “general election” takes place in “November,”

not over a three-month period beginning in September.

The text of Article VII, Section 4 even more directly refutes the Virginia

Supreme Court’s interpretation. That section provides that “[r]egular elections for

[county and city] officers shall be held on Tuesday after the first Monday in

November.” Va. Const. art. VII, § 4. The decision below purports to distinguish that

provision based on “context,” App. 27a n.30, but fails to explain what context would

justify treating an “election” for local officers as taking place on a single day whereas

19

an “election” for members of the General Assembly takes place over a period of

months. That alleged different meaning is especially inexplicable because those two

elections are often conducted simultaneously in November of odd-numbered years.

Two additional sections of Article IV provide that the members of the General

Assembly “shall be elected . . . on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in

November.” Va. Const., art. IV, §§ 2, 3 (emphasis added). The decision below

suggested that by using the verb “elected,” this section does not indicate that the

“election” took place on that single day in November. That anomalous interpretation

is at odds with the straightforward understanding, consistent across state and federal

law, that a candidate is “elected” on the day of the “election.”

Constitutional history demonstrates an unchanging text that confirms this

interpretation. The Virginia Constitution has set elections to take place on a single

day for more than 150 years, long before the General Assembly established early

absentee voting. See Va. Const. art. IV, §§ 41-42 (1902) (members of the General

Assembly “shall be elected . . . on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in

November”); Va. Const. art. V, §§ 2-3 (1870) (members of the General Assembly “shall

be elected . . . on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November”). And the

Virginia Constitution has long required that the General Assembly refer

amendments to the next session after a “general election.” See Va. Const. art. XV, § 1

(1902) (“such proposed amendment shall be . . . referred to the General Assembly at

its first regular session held after the next general election”); Va. Const. art. XII, § 1

(1870) (“such proposed amendment shall be . . . referred to the general assembly to

20

be chosen at the next general election”). This constitutional history establishes that

the General Assembly must pass the proposed amendment before an election taking

place on a single day in November.

Virginia’s statutes governing elections—including the version enacted by the

first General Assembly sitting under the 1971 Constitution—further corroborate this

interpretation. The Code defines “general election” to mean “an election held in the

Commonwealth on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November or on the first

Tuesday in May.” Code § 24.2-101. See also id. § 24.2-603 (setting polling place hours

“on the day of the election”). The Code further provides that voter “registration

records shall be closed during the 10 days before a primary or general election.” Code

§ 24.2-416. Finally, the Code provides that “[a]bsentee voting in person shall be

available on the forty-fifth day prior to any election.” Code § 24.2-701.1(A) (emphasis

added). Virginia law thus defines early absentee voting as taking place prior to an

election, not constituting part of the election. Absentee ballots cast before Election

Day are then counted “on the day of the election.” Code § 24.2-712(D). The first

General Assembly’s understanding of the term “general election” also referred to a

single day. Act of Mar. 1, 1971, ch. 119, § 1, 1971 Va. Acts 203 (amending and

reenacting § 24.1-1 of the Code of Virginia) (“‘General election’ means any election

held in the Commonwealth on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, or in

the case of elections for the governing bodies of cities and towns on the first Tuesday

in May, pursuant to Chapter 7, Article 1 (§ 24.1-95 et seq.) of this title”). The first

legislature sitting after the Constitution’s adoption demonstrates its meaning. See

21

CFPB v. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am., Ltd., 601 U.S. 416, 432-34 (2024) (“The

practice of the First Congress” in first annual appropriations law, Act of Sept. 29,

1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95, “provides contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the

Constitution’s meaning”).

Finally, in the Proclamation following the ratification of the 1971 Constitution,

Governor Linwood Holton announced that the Constitution had been ratified “by the

votes cast in the general election on November 3, 1970,” not “the votes cast in the

general election starting on the day the first absentee ballot was cast through

November 3, 1970.” See Proclamation (“Pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 763

of the Acts of Assembly of 1970, I, Linwood Holton, Governor of Virginia, do hereby

proclaim that by the votes cast at the general election on November 3, 1970, as

ascertained and determined by the State Board of Elections at its meeting held on

November 23, 1970, that all four proposals to amend the Constitution of Virginia were

ratified as shown below.”).

In summary, the text of the Virginia Constitution—along with the

contemporaneous understandings of both the legislative and executive branches at

the time of the Constitution’s ratification—unquestionably refute the Virginia

Supreme Court’s interpretation. All that remains is the Virginia Supreme Court’s

policy-driven preferences that, contrary to the Constitution’s text, (1) “election”

means something different in one place in the Constitution than it does everywhere

else in the Constitution, in statutes, and under federal law, and (2) the General

Assembly be required to pass a proposed constitutional amendment prior to the start

22

of early voting. Whatever the merits of that policy proposal, it is plainly not present

in the Constitution that the people of the Commonwealth adopted.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5865227&forum_id=2#49880729)