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The aspie nerd who set Israeli SIGINT back 20 years - link

From a 180 book about the 1973 Yom Kippur war: Four Syria...
German pumo
  08/29/26
U believe this drivel?
VoteRepublican
  08/29/26
It's from the most respected history of the war, but I'm sur...
German pumo
  08/29/26
And then Syria somehow still lost
Der Penis
  08/29/26
The day’s results were devastating for the air force a...
German pumo
  08/29/26


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Date: August 29th, 2026 9:11 PM
Author: German pumo

From a 180 book about the 1973 Yom Kippur war:

Four Syrian helicopters lifted off at 2 p.m. and headed toward the Israeli position. One of the craft crashed when its rotor struck a slope but the others landed their troops safely. Artillery fire was placed on the Israeli outpost to keep the defenders’ heads down. At 2:45 p.m., the attack force from the Syrian Hermon reached the outpost. In the absence of trenches or firing positions, the Golani soldiers could only fire from the narrow entranceways to the structure.

After an exchange of fire lasting forty-five minutes, the surviving defenders pulled back into the building and slammed shut the metal door. By 5 p.m. the attackers, dropping grenades and smoke canisters through air ducts, had forced their way in. Eleven men managed to escape but thirteen were killed and thirty-one taken prisoner, four of them after hiding in a basement for seven days. Soviet and East German experts who arrived to dismantle the electronic equipment were exultant to discover most of it intact.

For the Syrians, an even greater windfall was the information elicited from Israeli intelligence personnel during interrogation, particularly from a lieutenant named Amos.

When his commander at SIGINT headquarters learned that the Hermon had fallen, he prayed that Amos had not been taken alive. In Arab hands, the young officer was a threat to some of Israel’s most guarded intelligence secrets. He had a curiosity about things, important or trivial, that was obsessive. He read everything at headquarters he could get his hands on. He also had a photographic memory and a compulsion to display it. He would challenge his colleagues to ask him the car license number of any officer on base and his answers were inevitably right. His analyses of Syrian systems were brilliant but his commander found his obsessiveness and nerdiness annoying in the extreme.

In the days before the war, as tensions in SIGINT headquarters mounted, the commander decided that Lieutenant Amos was too much of a distraction and ordered him transferred to the Hermon listening post. An aide pointed out that IDF policy barred the assignment of soldiers like Amos, the only son of a widowed mother, to dangerous posts. The commander said that the Hermon was unlikely to be attacked and insisted that he did not want him at headquarters. It did not take long after Amos’s capture for the Syrians, and their Soviet mentors, to realize that a treasure had fallen into their hands. Held separately from the other prisoners, he was told that Israel had fallen and that any information he gave would not harm his country because it no longer existed. It was not an implausible claim to prisoners who had witnessed the stunning collapse of Israel’s defenses in the opening hours of the war.

His interrogator displayed a gun and told Amos he would be killed if he did not cooperate but, unlike the other prisoners, he was not tortured. He answered all questions at exhaustive length—in Arabic, which he spoke fluently. He gave the names and duties of SIGINT’s officers, revealed which Syrian communication lines were being tapped, where Israeli commando units placed listening devices on Syrian territory, how Israeli intelligence was organized. As Amos’s bounty poured forth without pause, his interrogators found it difficult to keep up. In the end, they gave him paper and a pen and told him to just write down whatever he knew. Which he did over the coming days.

He had far more answers than they had questions. When he was done, drained of secrets, he was taken to a large cell where he was astonished to find some thirty other Israeli prisoners—pilots and tank crewmen—sitting in a circle on the floor. They made room for him. When he learned that some had been captured days after Israel had supposedly fallen, he covered his face with his hands and said, “It will take twenty years to repair the damage I’ve done.” The effect of his revelations was felt almost immediately by SIGINT whose listening devices lost track of Syrian command and intelligence personnel.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5898867&forum_id=2...id..#50102652)



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Date: August 29th, 2026 9:28 PM
Author: VoteRepublican (A true Chad!! where's your gf/wifew?)

U believe this drivel?

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5898867&forum_id=2...id..#50102687)



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Date: August 29th, 2026 9:36 PM
Author: German pumo

It's from the most respected history of the war, but I'm sure a random XO guy knows better.

https://www.amazon.com/Yom-Kippur-War-Encounter-Transformed-ebook/dp/B000XUBECU?crid=22MJD7YFUILVB&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.DSMMX57wV41qxECDMO0dnc2TkC7zmxyIi9J4JOF2iqFPJ-xmrH0chOcw2i0GvXPxqEQwPgxii4gSTB02nzg1lb2diXWQIHisS7XqQLZQ2tL0mzzp3OO-alWob0M10CCejv69ynHiWVz-EAvN2utSoHFIxhLhKQ-5feHQrvpLkV8Y2xZLflMDJ5zrlV_9jjmC1x5VrRDnmdWHXWBn-9YmUiA7S-4Q71XCS7Ge4z8STwQ.eJwiKKFz39qxKcvsRtk_By_izy0tK276RAJDDHvgoWw&dib_tag=se&keywords=yom+kippur+war+kindle&qid=1787970264&sbm=true&setroute=search&sprefix=%2Caps%2C157&sr=8-1

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5898867&forum_id=2...id..#50102718)



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Date: August 29th, 2026 9:19 PM
Author: Der Penis

And then Syria somehow still lost

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5898867&forum_id=2...id..#50102662)



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Date: August 29th, 2026 9:34 PM
Author: German pumo

The day’s results were devastating for the air force and for Israel’s entire defense posture. Tagar had been aborted and Dougman had failed miserably. The IAF, normally so meticulous and decisive, had been jarred into sloppy haste. In a single day, its reputation for invincibility had been shaken, a startling turn of events that affected the self-confidence of the decision makers and of the air force itself. Its role as a powerful, quasi-independent strategic entity at Israel’s cutting edge had given way to that of a harried subcontractor for the ground army, rushed from front to front in a fruitless attempt to stem the Arab tide. The toll would be heavy. In the first four days of war, Israel would lose 83 planes—a quarter of its combat aircraft—half shot down, the rest seriously damaged.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5898867&forum_id=2...id..#50102710)